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BY LYNN A. STOUT
UCLA School ofLaw
hen credit markets froze up in
the fall of 2008, many economists
pronounced the crisis inexplica-
ble and unforeseeable. Lawyers
who specialize in financial regu-
lation, and especially the small
cadre who specialize in deriva-
tives regulation, knew better. (Some had even predicted the
crisis; see the Readings below.) That's because the roots of the
catastrophe lay not in changes in the markets, but changes
in the law. In particular, the credit crisis can be traced to Con-
gress's 2000 passage of the Commodity Futures Modern-
ization Act, which radically altered the traditional legal
approach to financial derivatives.
This shift in the legal treatment of financial derivatives has
brought the banking system to its knees. The leading cause of
the credit crisis was widespread uncertainty over insurance
giant AIG's trading losses in the new and rapidly growing mar-
ket for credit default swaps (CDSs), a kind of derivative bet that
issuers will not default on their bond obligations. Because AIG
was part of an already enormous and poorly understood web of
CDs bets and counter-bets among the world's largest banks,
investment funds, and insurance companies, when AIG col-
lapsed, many of those firms worried that they too might soon
be bankrupt. Only a massive $180 billion government-funded
bailout of AIG prevented the entire system from imploding.
This could have been avoided if we had kept the traditional
approach to derivatives regulation.
Wait a minute, some readers might say. What do you
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mean, traditional approach to derivatives regulation? Aren't
derivatives some new, modern financial "innovation" that has
never been regulated?
Well, no. Derivatives have a long history that offers four
basic lessons. First, derivatives contracts have been used for
centuries, possibly millennia. Second, while derivatives can be
useful for hedging, they are also ideal instruments for spec-
ulation. Third, excessive speculation is linked with a variety
of economic ills, including increased systemic risk when
derivatives speculators go bust. Fourth, derivatives specula-
tion traditionally has been "regulated" not through heavy-
handed bans on trading, but through a curious but effective
rule that protected and enforced derivative contracts used for
hedging purposes while declaring purely speculative con-
tracts to be legally unenforceable wagers. This rule of unen-
forceability encouraged speculators to rely on private order-
ing and to develop and police their own private markets
(exchanges). Exchanges in turn limited systemic risk.
HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES
Finance economists and Wall Street traders like to surround
derivatives with confusing jargon. Nevertheless, the idea
behind a derivative contract is quite simple. Derivatives are not
really "products" and they are not really "traded." They are
simply bets on the future - nothing less and nothing more.
Just as you might bet on which horse you expect to win a
horserace, you can bet on whether interest rates on bank
deposits will rise or fall by entering an interest rate swap
contract, or bet on whether a bond issuer will repay its bonds
by entering a credit default swap contract.
These sorts of commercial wagers are neither new nor
particularly innovative. Although derivatives have gone by
many different names, they have been around for centuries.
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Originally, most commercial derivatives were bets on the
future prices of agricultural commodities, like the rice deriv-
atives traded in Japan in the 15th century or the corn and
wheat futures traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
today. To use the language of derivatives traders, the "under-
lying" - that is, the thing being bet upon - was the future
market price of rice, wheat, or corn.
The first financial derivatives may have been stock options,
which were common by the 1800s. The 1990s saw an explo-
sion in other types of derivatives contracts, including bets on
interest rates (interest rate swaps), credit ratings (credit default
swaps), and even weather derivatives. By 2008, the notional
value of the derivatives market - that is, the size of the out-
standing bets as measured by the value of the things being bet
upon - was estimated at $600 trillion. This figure amounts
to about $100,000 in derivative bets for every man, woman,
and child on the planet.
This sudden development of an enormous market in deriv-
ative contracts was not the result of some new idea or inno-
vation. Rather, it was a consequence of dramatic shifts in the
legal status of speculative derivatives trading.
DERIVATIVES REGULATION
Just as derivatives have been around for centuries, so have dif-
ferent forms of derivatives regulation. In the United States
and the United Kingdom, derivatives traditionally were subject
to a common-law rule known as the "rule against difference
contracts." As described in the 1884 U.S. Supreme Court case
of Irwin v. Williar, the rule against difference contracts allowed
you to wager on anything you liked, from sporting contests, to
wheat prices, to interest rates. But - here is the catch - the rule
did require that ifyou wanted a court to enforce your wager, you
had to demonstrate to the judge's satisfaction that at least one
of the parties to the wager either held title to the underlying
thing being bet on, or was legally obligated to take title to the
underlying. A CDS contract, for example, would only have been
enforced if one of the parties actually owned the bonds on
which the CDS was written. Similarly, an interest rate swap
would only have been enforced to the extent one of the parties
was paying or receiving interest on a bond or cash deposit. In
other words, the rule against difference contracts required
that, in order for a derivative contract to be legally enforceable,
one of the parties to the contract had to be using the contract
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to hedge against a preexisting economic risk.
This was allowed because wagers can be useful for hedging
against risk. For example, if you own a corporate bond and
you are worried the issuer might default, you can hedge that
risk by entering a CDS contract, essentially betting against the
issuer's creditworthiness. If the bond decreases in value, the
CDS increases. Similarly, if you own a $500,000 home, you can
hedge the risk your home will burn down by making a bet with
a fire insurance company to pay you $500,000 if the home
actually burns. (Most of us call these wagers "insurance,"
although a Wall Street derivatives dealer might label them
"home value swaps.") Using derivatives this way is truly hedg-
ing, and it serves a useful social purpose by reducing risk.
But as common-law judges recognized for centuries, deriv-
ative bets are also ideally suited for pure speculation. Spec-
ulation is the attempt to profit not from producing some-
thing, or even from providing investment funds to someone
else who is producing something, but from predicting the
future better than others predict it. A speculator might, for
example, try to make money predicting wildfires by buying
fire insurance on houses in Southern California without
actually owning the houses themselves. Similarly, a specula-
tor might hope to profit from betting on a company's fate
by buying CDSs on the company's bonds without buying the
bonds themselves.
Speculation is a zero-sum game where one party's trading
gains always mirror the other's trading losses. But at least
when a speculator trades with a hedger, the trade reduces the
hedger's risk. When a speculator trades with another specu-
lator, however (one speculator thinks prices or interest rates
or credit ratings are going up, the other thinks they're going
down), speculation increases speculators' risks, much the
same way gambling increases gamblers' risks. Highly specu-
lative markets are also historically associated with asset price
bubbles, reduced returns, price manipulation schemes, and
other economic ills.
Common-law judges accordingly viewed purely speculative
contracts with suspicion. Under the rule against difference
contracts and its sister doctrine in insurance law, the require-
ment of "insurable interest," derivative contracts that could-
n't be proved to hedge an economic interest for at least one




This didn't mean derivatives couldn't be used to speculate. But
the rule against difference contracts forced speculators to
think about how to make sure their fellow gamblers paid their
bets. The answer was for the speculators to set up private
exchanges, like the Chicago Mercantile, with membership
requirements, margin requirements, netting requirements, and
a host of other rules designed to make sure that, despite the
legal invalidity of speculative contracts, speculating traders
would make good on their contract promises.
In the process, the private exchanges kept derivatives spec-
ulation within reasonable limits and under controlled con-
ditions. This did not stop the government from eventually cre-
ating agencies like the Commodities Futures Trading Com-
mission and the Securities and Exchange Commission to
regulate trading on particular exchanges. But off the
exchanges, the old common-law rule against difference con-
tracts served as the primary check against speculation in
"over the counter" (OTC) derivatives.
At least, it kept OTC speculation in check until the rule
was dismantled. The dismantling began when the UK passed
its Financial Services Act of 1986, "modernizing" its finan-
cial laws by making all financial derivatives, whether used
for hedging or for speculation, legally enforceable. U.S. reg-
ulators, worried that Wall Street banks might lose out on a
lucrative new market, followed suit in the 1990s by creating
ad hoc regulatory exemptions for particular types of finan-
cial derivatives like currency forward contracts and interest
rate swaps. The legalization of OTC interest rate swaps was
promptly followed by the swaps-fueled bankruptcies of
Orange County, Calif., in 1994, Barings Bank in 1995, and
hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in
1999. Nevertheless, despite these object lessons, the U.S.
Congress embraced wholesale legalization of OTC finan-
cial derivatives in 2000 with the Commodities Futures Mod-
ernization Act.
The 2000 act declared financial derivatives exempt from
CFTC or SEC oversight. But it also declared all financial deriv-
atives legally enforceable. The act thus eliminated, in one fell
swoop, a legal hurdle to OTC derivatives speculation that
dated back not just decades but centuries. It was this change
in the law not some flash of genius on Wall Street - that
created today's $600 trillion derivatives market.
SPECULATION AND SYSTEMIC RISK
The results have proven unfortunate, to say the least. Yet it's sur-
prising the newly unleashed OTC derivatives market didn't
lead to economic disaster even sooner. Well before AIG, deriv-
atives speculation had already led to the collapse not only of
Orange County, Barings Bank, and LTCM in the 1990s, but also
to Enron's 2001 bankruptcy and to the implosion of investment
bank Bear Stearns in 2008, a few months before AIG's fall.
These examples illustrate why it is essential for policy-
makers thinking about how derivatives affect systemic risk to
distinguish (as common-law judges did) between the use of
derivatives contracts for hedging and their use for pure spec-
ulation. Hedging provides a social benefit by reducing the
hedging party's risk. But when speculators trade with other
speculators, they increase their risks, just as gamblers increase
their risks by betting with other gamblers. Unchecked deriv-
atives speculation thus adds risk to the system by making it
possible for individual speculators like AIG (and Orange
County, Barings, LTCM, Enron, and Bear Stearns) to lose very
large amounts of money very unexpectedly.
But wait, some readers might say. Couldn't AIG have been
an unusual case, a rogue insurance company that succumbed
to speculative fever? Isn't it possible most financial derivatives
users wisely confine their derivatives deals to true hedging?
Given the stigma attached to speculation, it is not sur-
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prising that most parties to derivatives contracts claim, at least
in public, that they use derivatives for hedging and not for
speculation. In some cases this seems a rather transparent
attempt at deception. (Hedge funds, for example, are really
speculation funds, as it is quite clear they are in the business
of trying to reap profits at other traders' expense.) Perhaps
more often, derivatives traders incorrectly describe them-
selves as "hedging" when they are really "hedging a bet" and
using derivatives to offset some of the risk associated with tak-
ing a speculative position. This is much the same as the race-
track gambler who claims she is "hedging" when, in addition
experiment. It is almost as if Congress said to itself, "Let's see
what happens if we suddenly removed centuries of law!" Now
we know what happens. The experiment has not turned out well.
What to do? The answer seems obvious: go back to what
worked well before. By refusing to devote public resources to
enforcing an OTC derivatives contract unless at least one of
the parties to the contract either owned or was legally obli-
gated to take ownership of the asset underlying the contract,
the common-law rule against difference contracts created
an elegant legal sieve to separate socially useful hedging con-
tracts from risk-increasing, purely speculative wagers. Courts
The rule against difference contracts created a sieve
to separate socially useful hedging contracts
from risk-increasing, purely speculative wagers.
to betting on a particular horse to win, she also buys a tick-
et for the horse to show.
Despite all the hedging talk, the data suggest speculation
drives the OTC derivatives markets. For example, we know the
CDS market was dominated by speculation in 2008. We know
this because by the end of that year, the notional value of the CDS
market had reached $67 trillion, according to the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS). At the same time, the total
market value of all the underlying bonds issued by U.S. com-
panies outstanding was only $15 trillion, according to the BIS.
When the notional value of a derivatives market is more than
four times larger than the market for the underlying, it is a math-
ematical certainty that most derivatives trading is speculation,
not hedging. And business history - including very recent his-
tory - shows derivatives speculation increases systemic risk.
It is possible, of course, that derivatives speculators provide
other benefits to the market to offset the social cost of this
increased systemic risk. Although from a returns perspective
speculation is a zero-sum game - one trader's gain necessarily
comes at another trader's expense, just as gamblers can only
make money by taking money away from other gamblers -
economists sometimes claim that speculators add useful liq-
uidity to markets or that speculation can improve the accu-
racy of market prices. The derivatives industry routinely
repeats this mantra. Yet there is virtually no empirical evidence
to establish the value of the supposed liquidity and "price dis-
covery" benefits from derivatives speculation, much less evi-
dence that shows the value of those benefits exceeds the
enormous social cost of the systemic risk created by deriva-
tives speculation. Taxpayers have spent nearly $180 billion on
the AIG bailout alone.
WHAT TO DO?
Although few observers appreciated it at the time, the sudden
legalization of OTC financial derivatives was a novel legislative
and parties had little difficulty distinguishing the two cate-
gories, just as today courts still only enforce, and insurance
companies still only write, insurance policies for parties who
have an insurable interest.
The rule against difference contracts thus operated as a no-
cost, hands-off system of OTC derivatives regulation. (There
is no cheaper form of government intervention than refusing
to intervene at all, even to enforce a deal.) This "regulation by
deregulation" did not stop speculators from using derivatives.
But it did require speculators to be much more careful about
their counterparties and to avoid derivatives deals with coun-
terparties they thought might come to regret - and try to
avoid performing - their part of the bargain. It also encour-
aged derivatives speculators to organize private exchanges
where speculation could take place in an environment where
traders were well-capitalized and knew who was trading what,
with whom, when. This approach kept runaway speculation
from adding intolerable risk to the financial system. And it
did not cost a penny of taxpayer money.
During the roaring 1990s, when financial derivatives were
being widely applauded as risk-reducing, highly efficient
(and, for Wall Street, highly profitable) financial "innova-
tions," the old rule against difference contracts had little
appeal. Maybe it has more now.
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